INTRODUCTION
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) sets the rules for the Internet addressing systems that make it possible for users to send email, view webpages, or otherwise connect to Internet resources. Its most visible function is to supervise the domain name system, which identifies Internet resources by "domain names" such as "wayne.edu" or "threecats.net." ICANN's control gives it authority over how domain names are structured and what they look like; it gives it regulatory and economic power over a substantial set of businesses involved with Internet addressing. This is no small thing. Individuals and businesses, today, control (and pay for) over 200 million domain names.' And ICANN's decisions have * Professor of Law, Wayne State University. I owe thanks to Jessica Litman, A. Michael Froomkin, Milton Mueller, Fiona Alexander, Avri Doria, Bret Fausett, Jeanette Hofmann, and Paul Stahura for answering questions or pointing out my errors. None of them is responsible for (or necessarily agrees with) anything I say here. I was a legal-scholar-inresidence at the U.S. Federal Communications Commission in 1997-98, and participated via an interagency working group in the U.S. government's policymaking process regarding Internet identifiers, during the period leading up to ICANN's creation. Later on, I was the co-chair of an ICANN working group established to formulate recommendations regarding the deployment of new generic top-level domains. None of those organizations necessarily shares my views either.
1.
See The Domain Name Industry Brief, VERISIGN (Nov. 2010), http://www. verisigninc.com/assetsVerisignDNIB-Nov201 0_WEB.pdf. 189 bite: they are responsible for mechanisms such as the "uniform dispute resolution policy" that divests registrants of names deemed too similar to other entities' trademarks, 2 along with a variety of other mechanisms designed to fence off particular categories of domain names from registration by the wrong people (or by anyone at all). ' They determine what sort of names are visible on the Net, and what sort are not. 4 What kind of organization, then, is ICANN? It is in form a private body, a California-based § 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation. 5 Yet when it comes to ICANN, the usual lines between what is private and what is public have always been blurred. In this Essay, I will address the relationship between ICANN and national governments, and how that relationship has changed over time. I'll discuss the changing nature of ICANN's relationship with the U.S. government, as well as the evolution of other national governments' policy-making role within ICANN.
The U.S. government was deeply involved with ICANN at the time of its formation; other world governments played a much smaller role. Those governments' functional role remained narrow even after ICANN's reinvention in 2002 gave them a greater formal say. In recent years, though, the United States has channeled most of its interaction with ICANN into a multilateral forum-ICANN's Government Advisory Committee (GAC), with representatives from a wide range of national governments-and the GAC has been increasingly involved in ICANN processes. But in part by virtue of an institutional structure carried over from the organization's formation, when it was thought that world governments should have little formal role in a "privatized" ICANN, the relationship today between ICANN and national governments is incoherent and problematic. obscured more than it revealed. To be sure, the U.S. government had funded the development and maintenance of the naming and addressing infrastructure. But Postel had made his key decisions without meaningful policy supervision by the U.S. Department of Defense, and NSI had made its own with only a limited degree of supervision by the National Science Foundation.1 3 In that sense, domain name decision-making had been essentially private all along.14 Before ICANN's creation, U.S. government authority over the domain name space was unclear. Key actors denied or challenged that authority. Those actors included NSI, which took the view that it owned the .com, .net, and .org registration databases, and-upon the expiration in 1998 of its fiveyear cooperative agreement with the National Science Foundation-would be free to do whatever it wanted with them.' 5 They included a new body called the International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC), set up in 1996 with Postel's blessing, which sought to establish its own new domain naming order.' 6 They included Postel himself: in January 1998, Postel famously attempted to demonstrate his independence from U.S. policy supervision and control by directing the root server operators to take their copies of the root zone directly from him, rather than from the NSI-operated server on which the authoritative root zone was then stored. White House senior adviser Ira Magaziner, then in charge of the U.S. government's domain name policy paper-05jun98.htm; Amendment 6 to ICANNIDOC Memorandum of Understanding, ICANN (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.icann.org/en/generallamend6-jpamou-17sepO3.htm (explaining that the formation of ICANN was part of a process "of privatizing the technical management of the Internet and its underlying domain name system (DNS) now performed by or on behalf of the U.S. Government or by third parties under arrangements or agreements with the U.S. Government").
13.
"Limited" supervision, to be sure, is not the same as no supervision. A variety of NSI registration policies-including an initial ban on multiple domain name registrations by a single entity, as well as other policies directed towards making registration easy-stemmed from NSF policy choices. See Froomkin, supra note 6, at 106-7. But NSF, which saw itself as a funding agency rather than a regulatory one, was increasingly disinclined to engage in firstorder domain-name policymaking after it stopped underwriting the registration process in 1995. The Defense Department, for its part, ended any involvement in the substance of domain name decision-making in the 1980s (although a well-informed industry observer has conveyed his recollection to me that the Department's "contract technical representative" was involved in that decision-making during the early days of the domain name system). See Email from Anthony M. Rutkowski to author (July 6, 2000) (on file with author).
14. The U.S. government won that round; Postel withdrew his direction. And the government was similarly able to beat back the challenge from IAHC by directing NSI to decline to make the changes in the root zone that would be needed to implement the IAHC plan.'" But these were assertions of government authority made in the course of the U.S. government's professed "privatization." The key move in the creation of today's Internet governance structure, thus, was not the abdication of U.S. government authority, but its assertion at a time when that authority was highly contested. As Sebastian Botzem and Jeanette Hofmann have put it, "the U.S. government imposed public authority onto a largely self-regulatory structure with the official objective of privatizing it"-a move whose "inherent contradiction became obvious" shortly afterwards.' 9 It's not really surprising that the U.S. government should have sought to impose its own authority over Internet addressing. Government decisionmakers, after all, thought the domain-name and IP-address system was important, and wanted to set it on what they deemed to be the best possible institutional and policy footing. The U.S. government thus established an interagency working group in 1997 to consider domain name policy, passed that group's work product to Magaziner for further consultations and development, and after a long slog finally succeeded in seeing a modified version of that policy reflected in ICANN's founding documents.
0
The resulting structure, while setting out a strong ICANN policymaking role, also gave the U.S. government the opportunity to exercise extensive authority.
2 ' Especially at the outset, ICANN was highly dependent on U.S. government support in its battles to exercise authority, in particular over NSI. As Stuart Lynn, ICANN's then-CEO, put it in 2002: "[E]ach of ICANN's accomplishments to date have all depended, in one way or another, on government support, particularly from the United States."
22 Moreover,
17.
See id. at 55 (Postel backed down facing "threats made in the name of the US Government"); Froomkin, supra note 6, at 64-65; see also MUELLER, Supra note 6, at 161-62; Weinberg, supra note 6, at 205 n.92. the U.S. government retained a veto over any ICANN action pertaining to the contents of the root zone. As a practical matter, then, during ICANN's formative period, the U.S. government was first on the list of actors that ICANN simply could not afford to antagonize.
18.
Law professor A. Michael Froomkin, not long after ICANN's formation, argued that ICANN's founding documents and initial practice gave the U.S. government the power to veto essentially all of its decisions. 23 The U.S. Department of Commerce, he continued, had so much control over ICANN's operations as to make its failure to countermand any ICANN decision reviewable in federal court under the Administrative Procedure Act.
24
While no court adopted this view, the very fact that it could be plausibly argued demonstrates the symbiotic connections between the two bodies. What about ICANN's relationship with other national governments? ICANN's founding documents contemplated only a weak informal advisory role for those governments, via a body called the Government Advisory Committee (GAC). 25 The GAC was made up of a single representative from each of the national governments that chose to send one. It was there to provide an informal mechanism for governments to communicate their views to ICANN on matters that concerned them; it had no role other than that of giving advice that might or might not be heeded.
26
In ICANN's early years, the GAC did not play a wide-ranging role. No more than thirty governments, all from more-developed countries, took the trouble to participate. 27 For the most part, it confined its attentions to matters of interest to governments in their institutional capacities, such as the relationship of national governments to the country code top-level domains (ccTLDs), such as .fr and .uk, assigned to entities within each country. 28 timately, on the willingness of the US government to make it clear ... that it was not receptive to changes in the authoritative root zone file that were not managed through the ICANN process.
23.
See Froomkin, supra note 6, at 111.
24.
See id. at 125-38.
25.
See Although Jon Postel had delegated authority to run most ccTLDs to nongovernmental entities, national governments historically had thought of the ccTLDs as "belonging" to them; the question of national-government authority over the ccTLDs had been a matter of contention for years.
29
The GAC also focused on the registrability of country names and codes as domain names, and on the development of so-called "internationalized" domain names-that is, domain names using other than English-language characters, a matter taken seriously by governments whose official languages used such characters. 30 It paid little attention to most other issues within ICANN's scope. There was a reason the GAC had no formal role in the ICANN policy process: the rhetoric of privatization demanded it. The initial ICANN structure deliberately cut world governments out of the policy development process. The United States government, overseeing that process, saw its agenda as "support[ing] the efforts of private sector organizations to develop mechanisms to facilitate the successful operation of the Internet." 32 ICANN's framers contemplated, and its bylaws enshrined, an elaborate policy process in which a wide range of interested private parties would together, in working groups and otherwise, craft a policy that could be presented to the Board as a purported community consensus. World governments weren't to be part of that bottom-up deliberative process. Instead, the ICANN bylaws set up separate channels for informal government advice.
29.
For As ICANN emerged from its first three years of existence, thus, while it was sensitive to the desires of governments, it was not burdened by a need to work with them too much. One could be forgiven for thinking that ICANN staff, at this point in the organization's existence, would see ad-
33.
See vantages to this remove from day-to-day interaction with bureaucrats and politicians. In fact, though, three years after ICANN was formed, ICANN's CEO issued a call to action in which he identified the absence of systematic government involvement in ICANN as a crucial-and likely fatal-flaw in its structure.
39 CEO Stuart Lynn saw three key challenges facing ICANN. The first was the fact that it had not yet entered into the agreements it was seeking with key domain name players-the various root server operators, the regional IP address registries, and most of the ccTLD operatorsrecognizing ICANN's authority and formalizing their interaction. The second was what he characterized as ICANN's "unrealistic" and "Sisyphean" preoccupation with finding a workable mechanism for public representation and accountability. The third was a lack of funds.
40
If national governments were more directly involved in ICANN, Lynn reasoned, they would have greater incentive to pressure their ccTLDs to enter into contracts with ICANN formally recognizing its authority.
4 National governments also could supply ICANN with funding it badly lacked; 42 ICANN could use some of that money to buy the cooperation of the root server operators. 43 And, because national governments were in Lynn's words "the most evolved and best legitimated representatives of their populations," they were the answer to any questions about ICANN's democratic legitimacy." In order to secure all of these benefits, and to get the buy-in that would induce national governments to take these steps, Lynn proposed a new "public-private" structure for ICANN, in which fully a third of its Board members would be named directly by the GAC or by national governments. 45 The "Board seats for governments" plan was not popular with ICANN's various constituencies. Nongovernmental entities saw no basis for the
39.
See See id. (bemoaning the fact that many ccTLD registries were "unwilling (despite all the rational arguments and history to the contrary) to accept voluntarily the existence and authority of a global coordinating entity," and explaining that by virtue of government involvement in ICANN, those governments would "more effectively encourage" their ccTLDs' participation).
42. See id. ("All of the participants in the ICANN process that have the ability to pay a share of ICANN funding should do so. With 'skin in the game,' these participants will feel a more immediate and direct connection to the success of the ICANN process. And this includes governments.").
43.
See id. ("[Wie must move to a system where the root server operators are compensated for their critical services .... [W]e will ultimately need a more definitive and binding set of arrangements with the current and any future root name server operators, and that will require significantly greater funding than is presently available to ICANN.").
44.
Id.

45.
See id. The government-chosen Board members, however, would not themselves be "governmental employees with policymaking responsibilities." Rather, governments would select worthy private citizens for those Board seats. conclusion that giving governments a bigger ICANN role, and having them provide more funding, would be an improvement. 46 Governments appeared no more enthusiastic. 4 A European Commission response suggested that Lynn's proposal was a "radical redefinition of the relationship between the public and private sector actors in the Internet," and emphasized the EU's historic "support [of] the principle of private sector self-regulation." 48 A letter signed by the bipartisan leadership of the U.S. House Commerce Committee and the relevant subcommittee urged that the overall effect of Lynn's proposed changes would "make ICANN even less democratic, open, and accountable than it is today." 49 Governments may have seen little in the proposal for them; after all, the benefit to any particular national government of there being five people on the ICANN Board who had been selected by the GAC, but who nonetheless likely hailed from some other nation, wasn't great.
ICANN did, though, make key changes to its internal structure as a result of Lynn's initiative. , http://www.icann.org/en/committees/gac/statement-on-reform-26junO2.htm. France, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland, however, criticized the presence of even a nonvoting GAC representative on the Board, because "it would lead the GAC representative to deal with matters which have no direct public interest implication, create difficulties in discussions about topics where there is no GAC consensus, and be incompatible with GAC independence." Id.
48 [Vol. I18: 189 was this: under the post-2002 rules, the GAC has free-wheeling authority to "advise" the ICANN Board on public policy matters, and if the Board chooses not to take GAC advice, its bylaws require that the Board and GAC "try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution." If "no such solution can be found," the Board is free to implement its preferred policy after explaining the reasons for its choice.
5 ' It's plausible that what many governments wanted most from ICANN at the time, besides a greater degree of control over their local ccTLDs, was a mechanism allowing them to step in and exert influence reactively, in case ICANN seemed about to do something that threatened their interests 52 -and that's just what the strengthened GAC mechanism seemed designed to give them.5
The 2002 bylaws change had little immediate operational effect. The GAC's involvement in ICANN controversies continued to be episodic, reactive, and peripheral. The GAC did establish six internal working groups in 2003, addressing a range of important issues. 54 But its involvement 
52.
The GAC statement, supra note 47, emphasized that "government[s] . . . are responsible for public policy" and that the GAC's advice on public policy matters must be "duly taken into account both at the policy-drafting and at the decision-taking stage." Governmental Advisory Comm., Statement on ICANN Reform, ICANN (June 26, 2002), http://www.icann.org/en/committees/gac/statement-on-reform-26junO2.htm.
53.
Michael Froomkin has argued that enhancing the role of the GAC in 2002 gave ICANN important political advantages, both helping it to make friends outside the U.S. and giving it a presence in commerce and trade-based ministries that could act as a counterweight to communications ministries allied with the International Telecommunications Union. See 54. The working groups addressed ccTLDs, internationalized domain names, generic top-level domains, the security of the domain name system, IPv6 (a new system for distributing IP addresses that would impose substantial costs on large users), and WHOIS (that is, the public availability of information identifying domain name registrants Two developments helped to shift the GAC's role. First, world governments were becoming more attuned to ICANN-related issues. Some of those governments had grown frustrated with ICANN's U.S.-centrism, and others with its status as an informal, private organization rather than an intergovernmental body. 56 The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), a United Nations forum bringing together representatives of government, business, and civil society, became a focus for that frustration: a draft WSIS Declaration of Principles in March 2003 urged that domain-name management "must be multilateral, democratic and transparent, taking into account the needs of the public and private sectors as well as those of the civil society." To that end, it continued, ICANN's responsibilities "should rest with a suitable international, intergovernmental organization."" This was a naked challenge: ICANN is not an intergovernmental organization. The International Telecommunications Union is, and some developing country governments would have preferred to see ICANN supplanted by the ITU. It was never plausible, though, that the WSIS process would end with a decision that ICANN should be ousted of its authority. 
58.
No First World country supported ICANN's ouster. The European Union did express support for a greater role for governments in high-level policymaking concerning Internet names and numbers, but emphasized the need to "build on the existing structures of Internet Governance" rather than replacing them. World Summit on the Info. At the same time, the WSIS process helped shift the conventional wisdom about Internet governance in a way that contributed to a change in the GAC's role. One of the challenges to ICANN's authority mediated by WSIS was a claim that ICANN was making public policy decisions that rightfully should be made only by governments; ICANN's defenders pushed back with a "multistakeholder" model 60 in which governments had a legitimate role to play in the governance process, mediated through ICANN, along with other "stakeholder" groups. 6 ' It's important to grasp the rhetorical shift that took place here. The language of ICANN's founding contemplated governance by multiple Internet "stakeholders"; the White House, thus, described ICANN as "formed by private sector Internet stakeholders to administer policy for the Internet name and address system."
62 But those "stakeholders," as the White House language reveals, were all from the private sector. The new "multistakeholderism," by contrast, saw Internet name and address policy as the product of discussions among governments together with business and civil society.
63
The final WSIS document (the "Tunis Agenda") made plain that governments-along with "the private sector, civil society and international organizations"-should be fully involved in the international management of the Internet.' It characterized "authority for Internet-related public policy issues" as "the sovereign right of States."1 6
It referenced "multistakeholderism" more than a dozen times, 66 institutionalizing a new way of conceiving the government role in ICANN, and laid the foundation for a greater role for governments in ICANN via the GAC.
67
All of this took place on the level of diplomat-speak and theory, though; it took concrete events to move the story along. They began in the spring of 2004, when a private entity called ICM Registry proposed to establish an .xxx top-level domain, "intended primarily to serve the needs of the global
60.
See, e.g., World Summit on the Info. Soc'y, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society,  [ 37, 41, 67, 72, 73, 78, 83, 97, 98, 101, 102, 105, 108, 110 
66.
Seeid. $ 1-122.
67.
See MUELLER, supra note 31, at 77-78. I am indebted to Fiona Alexander for emphasizing this point to me.
201
Fall 2011]) online adult-entertainment community." 68 In June 2005, the ICANN Board voted to approve that proposal. 69 Controversy followed. 70 National governments had not been engaged with the .xxx issue before the ICANN decision. Indeed, a letter from GAC chair Mohamed Sharil Tarmizi just two months before stated that "[n]o GAC members have expressed specific reservations or comments" about any of the pending top-level domain applications." Once the decision was made, though, representatives of a variety of national governments used the GAC forum to express their concern.
7 2 The U.S. government was not among the objectors initially; at first, it sought to minimize complaints in the GAC, suggesting that they should have been made earlier. 73 But within ten weeks, following campaigns against the decision by such organizations as the Family Research Council and Focus on the Family, the U.S. government came to play a leading role in opposition to the .xxx domain.
74
There followed letters expressing concern about, or seeking reconsideration of, ICANN's decision on .xxx from the U.S. Department of Commerce, the chair of the GAC, and the governments of Australia, the
68.
New 
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United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, and Brazil, as well as the Deputy Director-General of the European Commission.1 5 After further rounds of debate, with the GAC weighing in at all stages, ICANN ended up withdrawing its approval. 7 6 National governments had become involved with the issue late in the day, but their objections were powerful.
The .xxx incident had two important consequences. First, ICANN had earlier agreed that an international arbitration tribunal would have jurisdiction to hear certain challenges to its decisions." 1CM Registry sought review of ICANN's decision. The review panel ruled that ICANN's about-face on .xxx after the blossoming of U.S. and GAC objections "was not consistent with the application of neutral, objective and fair documented policy," and therefore violated its obligations." While the panel's authority was only advisory, the ICANN Board accepted its findings, and in 2011 formally approved the domain's inclusion in the root. 79 Second, as part of its campaign against the xxx domain, the United States had encouraged GAC members to weigh in, individually and as an organization, to exert such influence as they could in the ICANN arena.s 0 Empowered by that experience, GAC members sought to make their views known more broadly. Most immediately, the .xxx experience led the GAC to develop a set of Principles for New Top Level Domains. This document spoke to the process for adding any new "generic" top-level domain (gTLD), which in ICANN's taxonomy meant any top-level domain that was not a ccTLD identified with a particular country. An early version of the
75.
See FranciscoCommunique.pdf. The communiqu6 further noted "concerns expressed by experts" that actions by those governments to block the .xxx TLD could pose "a potential risklthreat to the universal resolvability and stability of the DNS," as well as concerns that the xxx registry operator's commitments to police the domain could move ICANN in the direction of "an ongoing management and oversight role regarding Internet content." The ICANN Board, finding in light of the arbitration decision that the domain application had met all relevant requirements, dismissed those concerns as inconsequential. 
203
Fall 2011]1 GAC Principles contemplated a powerful governmental role in the process of adding new gTLDs: it would have given any GAC member an effective veto over any proposed gTLD name. 8 ' The completed version of the Principles, in 2007, eliminated that veto, but it incorporated other directions covering the gamut of domain name policymaking concerns. gTLD names, they enjoined, should respect human rights, human dignity, and equality. They should not infringe "sensitivities regarding terms with national, cultural, geographic and religious significance." ICANN should avoid geographical names or descriptions of geographical languages or peoples, except with the permission of the relevant governments. There must be a procedure for blocking, "at no cost and on demand of governments," individuals or firms from registering any second-level "names with national or geographical significance" within the domain.
82
The GAC began to express its views more actively in areas other than those involving ccTLDs and new gTLDs. It intensified its involvement with WHOIS policy 83 and internationalized domain names. 84 It worked to im-
81.
See Draft GAC Guidelines on gTLDs, ICANN (Oct. 17, 2010), available at http://forum.icann.orglists/gtld-council/msg00307.htm ("If the GAC or individual GAC members express formal concerns about a specific new gTLD application, ICANN should defer from proceeding with the said application until GAC concerns have been addressed to the GAC's or the respective government's satisfaction."); see also MUELLER, supra note 31, at 202-03. The same document directed ICANN to bar any top-level domain name that "promote[d] hatred, racism, discrimination of any sort, criminal activity or any abuse of specific religions or cultures"; barred top-level domain names of "cultural" or "religious" significance unless the domain were sponsored by a "clear and legitimate candidate" and there were no "major objections from the community concerned"; and barred any top-level domain names identical to geographic names, absent the approval of the relevant national government. Draft GAC Guidelines at § § 2.1, 2.6, 2.12.
82.
See GAC Principles Regarding New gTLDs, ICANN (Mar. 28, 2007), available at http://gac.icann.org/system/files/gTLD-principles_0.pdf. A "second-level domain name" is the dot-delimited text string immediately to the left of the top-level name-such as "wayne" in www.wayne.edu. prove its working methods, and to become better integrated into ICANN policy development, so that it could operate proactively rather than reactively." It announced a plan for a more robust secretariat to enable it to work better outside of its thrice-annual meetings.8 6 Most importantly, the GAC became much more closely involved with ICANN's ongoing effort to define permissible top-level domain names going forward." It addressed narrow concerns-pushing for the exclusion from the generic top-level domain name space of anything that could be seen as representing a geographical name 88 -but also broader ones, playing a crucial role in ICANN's more general rethinking of how best to avoid controversial gTLD names. 89 In 2009, the GAC began expressing a newfound skepticism about whether new gTLDs were desirable at all; 90 in 2010, it began lobbying for new mechanisms privileging the rights of trademark owners in the context of any new TLD rollout. 9 1 It was clear by 2010 that the GAC had become much more openly involved in policy discussions and had come to demand a much more important role in the ICANN process.
83.
92
The GAC's internal functioning is still a mystery to outsiders-it is typically unclear how members' views are aggregated in constructing GAC policy positions. Its initiatives seem to be driven by a relatively small number of actors. 93 The United States, Canada, and the EU are said to be the GAC's leading players; the rise of the GAC may thus represent no more than a shift from authority centered on the United States to authority shared within an Atlantic alliance. Indeed, some suggest that "the US calls the shots in GAC" and that other governments, including the EU, can do no more than make "minor modifications to U.S. 
96.
See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 190-207. The U.S. government retained its authority over changes to the root zone file, and one should not imagine that the Affirmation manifests a sharp change in the U.S.-ICANN relationship. As I will detail in the next section, the U.S. government has been assertive, post-Affirmation, in pressing its views on ICANN.
mandates periodic reviews of ICANN and its policies, and gives the GAC a lead role in constituting the review teams.
97
All is not sweetness and light, though, for proponents of greater government influence in ICANN deliberations. The GAC's new assertion of authority and its flexing of muscle have outstripped the institutional forms in place to accommodate it. A recent internal review of ICANN processes described the relationship between the ICANN Board and the GAC as "dysfunctional."
8 I'll explain why in the next section.
III. THE GAC IN THE POLICY PROCESS
ICANN constituted an Accountability and Transparency Review Team (ATRT) in 2010, tasked with evaluating its mechanisms for public input, accountability, and transparency. 99 The ATRT saw much to improve in the relationship between ICANN's Board and the GAC. Some of the difficulties in that working relationship, it found, lie in the long period of time that sometimes must pass before the GAC can take a public position. For one thing, GAC members may need time-consuming consultations with their own national governments before negotiating with other GAC members. For another, the GAC itself meets only three times a year, and it is still developing its capacity to work between sessions.
00
But the ATRT report concluded that the difficulties go far beyond the GAC's internal workings. The report focused on an ambiguity in ICANN's bylaws as to what constitutes GAC "advice" triggering the bylaws requirement that ICANN "try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution." 10 ' GAC members had taken the position that any communication emanating from that body-a position paper, a letter from the chair, or a meeting communiqud summarizing member 
99.
The ATRT was part of the review mechanisms mandated by the Affirmation of Commitments.
100.
See A TRT Report, supra note 98, at 37; see also The Berkman Centr. for Internet & Soc'y, supra note 70, at 78-79. The Berkman Center report-which was generated as part of the ATRT process, and was attached as an exhibit to the ATRT report-thus notes the challenges posed by "disparate organizational culture, the challenges of aligning internal processes across multiple institutions, and complex cross-community communication mechanisms." The Berkman Centr. for Internet & Soc'y, supra note 70, at 46.
101.
See A TRT Report, supra note 98, at 3, 30-31, 35, 37. See generally supra text accompanying note 51 (discussing the ICANN bylaws). views-constituted GAC "advice." ICANN Board members and staff, for their part, disputed the notion that they were presumptively bound by the views in GAC meeting communiquds, when the views noted in those communiqu6s might not represent consensus or formally adopted GAC positions, and indeed might not be internally consistent.' 0 2
Moreover, the report noted, ICANN lacks a formal process for responding to GAC advice during the pendency of the policy development process. The new generic top-level domain policy process involved a series of steps in which ICANN staff issued tentative or draft documents, solicited public comment, and then issued new iterations of the documents. The GAC provided comments, and found that while not all of its positions had been incorporated in full in the new drafts, neither had the Board or staff formally and explicitly rejected its views. This left GAC actors feeling as if they had not been sufficiently listened to, and feeling that they had no choice but simply to repeat their demands in the next round.' 
103.
See ATRT Report, supra note 98, at 34 ("GAC members expressed concern that the Board is not providing feedback to the GAC on the advice it does provide to the Board. One GAC member commented that the GAC regularly has to repeat its advice in subsequent communiquds because the Board does not supply any response to the GAC that it is taking the GAC advice into account in its decision making."); The Berkman Centr. for Internet & Soc'y, supra note 70, at 49 ("The lack of clear procedures for the timely acknowledgement of and response to the range of GAC inputs by the Board may impede the policy development process, as the GAC may feel compelled to restate its positions when it has not received a sufficient response.").
In its October 2007 Communiqu6, the GAC expressed concerns that the GNSO In communications to the Board after the publication of this draft of the DAG, the GAC acknowledged that it was an improvement on the first version but that it did not yet fully represent the GAC's views. In response, representatives of the Internet
Commerce Association demanded to know why ICANN had chosen the recommendations of the GAC over those of the GNSO, in which geographic names were given less protection.
The Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc'y, supra note 70, at 80-81 (footnotes omitted).
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ICANN's initial bylaws,'" nor their 2002 reworking, contemplated that the GAC would participate in "bottom-up" policy deliberations and argumentation. Instead, the GAC was to present its own advice directly to the Board.' 0 5
This worked tolerably well so long as GAC involvement in ICANN policymaking was minor.
As we have seen, though, over time the GAC shifted its focus. No longer an uninvolved body concerned with only a very narrow band of issues seen as within its special jurisdiction, the GAC became aggressive, making broad arguments reflecting the views of private lobbies on a wide range of matters such as trademark protection. At the same time, the U.S. government (especially after the signing of the Affirmation of Commitments) channeled its own lobbying of ICANN into the GAC forum.
At that point the challenges of ICANN's structure became apparent. That structure did not provide for any interaction "inside" the ICANN policy process between the GAC and other interested parties-the registrars, say, or groups seeking to operate new top-level domains, or civil society groups. The GAC interacted with the Board and only with the Board.
The initial guiding principle of the ICANN policy process was that policy would be crafted in subsidiary fora, and presented to the Board for ratification only at the end of the process, when affected groups (not including the GAC) had already thrashed out a solution. GAC advice pertained to a consensus policy already presented to the Board, worked out and endorsed by the various non-GAC policy actors. If the GAC's view were negative, it would be seeking at the eleventh hour to squelch a proposal that had already acquired momentum and support.
The process included no way to resolve conflicts between the GAC and other participants, except through Board fliat. ICANN's Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO), which brings together the various constituencies that ICANN recognizes as having an interest in non-ccTLD domain names, provides a mechanism through which those participants can seek to work out their differences. But the GAC is not part of the GNSO process. The ICANN structure channels GAC participation into its privileged, separate route to the Board. If the Board declines to adopt the GAC's position, the GAC feels that it has not been granted proper respect and
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ICANN's 2002 rule changes rejected the earlier notion that the Board's only role was to ratify community consensus after a policymaking process that took place elsewhere; the organization recognized that consensus might not be possible on some issues, and the But the 2002 changes preserved-indeed embraced-the idea that in the typical situation, proposals reaching the Board would be the product of an extensive policy process, at lower levels of the organization, in which the various affected parties could work out their differences. And they contemplated that GAC involvement would take place only after that. These limitations became clear in the past couple of years in connection with ICANN's plan to reshape the way in which it adds new gTLDs to the domain name space. ICANN's most important job at its creation was to develop policy for the expansion of the domain name space.1o? Some argued that ICANN should immediately authorize hundreds of new top-level domain names; that approach, they urged, would best advance competition, innovation, and cultural diversity, allowing users and firms to decide which TLDs they chose to register in. Others argued for only the barest expansion.' ICANN in its first decade dropped in a small, restricted number of new top-level domains, after scrutinizing and approving each one from a business, financial, technical, and operational perspective. 
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See ing ICANN staff and subsidiary groups, on its way to ultimate Board approval in 2011. How was the GAC to involve itself in this process? It wouldn't be well served by absenting itself entirely during all the years in which the policy was being hammered out, and waiting for the result to be presented to the Board. And the GAC, indeed, filed comments on successive versions of the DAG.'1 2 But that badly fit the bylaws and earlier conceptions of the GAC role, which had the GAC interacting with the Board, not with ICANN staff. It was unclear just what ICANN was supposed to do when staff declined to incorporate a GAC recommendation in the DAG's latest iteration. ICANN sought to bring the GAC into the policy process in 2010 by setting up a "Cross-Community Working Group" (CCWG) in which GAC members, GNSO representatives, and members of ICANN's At-Large Advisory Committee (nominally representing individual Internet users) could seek to work out a particular contested matter. But the approach didn't succeed, again because of ambiguity about the GAC's role in the process. To be sure, the CCWG reached agreement on a set of policy recommendations, and duly forwarded them to the Board." 3 But the U.S. government, in particular, wasn't satisfied with the CCWG's resolution of the dispute. It floated a trial balloon urging the GAC to reject the CCWG's conclusion and to transmit formal advice demanding sweeping changes in the rules for authorization of new generic top-level domains."
4 Under the proposal the U.S. government floated, any GAC member would have been able to object to any gTLD name for any reason, and-unless some other GAC member sought to countermand the objection-the objection would have been binding on the Board. U.S. policymakers abandoned this proposal after criticism,"' but only intensified their attempts-through the GAC-to exercise a veto at the very last stages of the process.
In the last few months before the Board's adoption of its new gTLD plan in June 2011, negotiations over the details of that plan gave a sense of
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See Report on Implementation of GNSO New GTLD Recommendation #6, ICANN (Sept. 21, 2010), http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtids/report-rec6-cwg-21sepl0-en.pdf; ICANN and the GAC released continually-updated "scorecards" characterizing how far apart they were; the one ICANN drafted in advance of the meeting tracked fifty-four identified issues."' The negotiations continued after the meeting, and got more detailed. April 15 saw ICANN releasing a "Revised ICANN Notes on the GAC New gTLDs Scorecard" that tallied ICANN positions on eighty issues the GAC had raised. By that point, ICANN explained, it had narrowed the dispute to seventeen issues of substantive disagreement and eighteen more of differences regarding implementation, with three final questions marked "TBD."" The U.S. government urged that ICANN not go forward with new gTLDs until its disagreements with the GAC were "resolved."
22 It warned that ICANN needed to tend to its "political sustainability," expressing concern that if foreign governments were not satisfied with ICANN's attentiveness and deference to their views as expressed in the GAC, they might withdraw their support for ICANN and favor transfer of its authority to an international forum such as the ITU.1
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The "political sustainability" concern seemed rhetorical and not well founded. ICANN has consolidated its position in international and intergovernmental fora: the 2010 ITU Plenipotentiary Conference ended in an explicit recognition of ICANN's role.1 2 4 While there has been some (unsuccessful) international pressure to transfer ICANN authority to the ITU, it has come from developing countries and Russia, which have little ability to set the agenda in the GAC.1 2 5 The governments that are most influential in the GAC-which is to say, those that might be most angered by ICANN's rejection of GAC advice-are those of the United States and the EU, and those governments have consistently rejected endowing the ITU or any other which consensus was reached." Id. at § 3.1; see also New gTLD Program Explanatory Memorandum, ICANN (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/gac-objectionssensitive-strings-15apr 1-en.pdf. This direction, suggesting that ICANN would not defer to advice that did not meet its procedural standards, was a challenge to the traditional opacity of GAC advice, and to the ability of more influential GAC members to generate desired outcomes behind the group's closed doors.
122 26 There is no reason to think that they will change that position.1 27 U.S. government officials also were not shy, in May 2011 discussions of the Board-GAC negotiations, to note that the United States had before it the decision whether to renew ICANN's status as the entity performing the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) function.' 28 The "IANA function" includes a miscellany of tasks, one of which involves approving changes in the root zone file that includes all Internet top-level domains. For historical reasons, these tasks are carved off from ICANN's other activities, and are performed by ICANN pursuant to a free-standing contract with the U.S. government. That contract was due to expire on September 30, 2011; ICANN wanted to see it extended on favorable terms.1 2 9 The unspoken linkage was plain.
The U.S. government, indeed, on June 9 issued a Notice of Inquiry proposing to use the IANA contract as a vehicle for a demand that ICANN approve no new gTLDs without demonstrating that each new domain had "received consensus support from relevant stakeholders and is supported by the global public interest." 30 The proposal blithely ignored the fact that IANA activities since 1999 have been entirely ministerial when it came to gTLDs. It incorporated policy choices ICANN had rejected in preparing the new gTLD program: the Applicant Guidebook's requirements for approval of new TLDs required neither that applicants be able to show "consensus support" nor that they make a specific showing that the domains advance the global public interest.' 3 ' And in relying on the IANA contract as a means for unilateral United States control over naming policy, the U.S. government ignored the multilateralism that is its official policy in this arena.1 V. WHITHER THE GAC?
Even before the final stages of 2011's gTLD policy process, it was clear that ICANN faced a structural problem: the GAC cannot both assume a fully engaged role in the policy negotiation process and simultaneously have the power of a presumptive veto at the end of the process. Other players in the ICANN space will not be eager to negotiate, on an operational level, with an entity that asserts its right later on to repudiate those negotiations from a privileged position.
The GAC and ICANN thus face two key questions. The first relates to the degree of influence the GAC will be able to exert in the ICANN policy development process. In how broad a class of cases can the GAC, simply by virtue of its opposition, block or reverse a policy resolution that would otherwise have sufficient support to prevail in the multiplayer ICANN policy process?
The second relates to how institutional design channels that influence. If the GAC is to engage early in the process like any other policy participant, it must accept that its views will not always prevail. If it is to assert a presumptive veto late in the process, advising the Board directly, then it has the political disadvantage of opposing a policy resolution that has already gained momentum and support, and of seeking to introduce more delay into a process that could otherwise be completed more quickly. The GAC would like to exercise strong authority on both of those levels, but that does not seem workable or sustainable. It will not have credibility as a participant in the ordinary policy process unless it demonstrates willingness to accept the results of that process. And it does not appear at this point to have the leverage it would need to overpower a Board determined to assert its independence.
The United States has strongly advocated a "multistakeholder" model for ICANN, dating back to the WSIS negotiations, based on the idea that governments, industry representatives, and civil society representatives should all participate together in the Internet naming and numbering discourse.1 37 But the idea of multistakeholderism, without more, says nothing about how disputes between the various actors should be resolved.
ICANN's current instantiation of the multistakeholder approach seems to be that it develops policy through a somewhat-structured bottom-up process described in its bylaws, and then the GAC brings as much political influence to bear as it can, in order to change those aspects of ICANN's plans that American and European governments, and their most influential business lobbies, are dissatisfied with. That process worked in the recent gTLD policy process, in the sense that the GAC was pretty successful in pushing ICANN policy outcomes in its preferred direction. But there are limits to how successful the approach can be: notwithstanding the pendency of the IANA contract, the United States and other GAC nations have only limited levers of power over ICANN. ICANN is now institutionally well established. Moreover, the integrity and coherence of ICANN's processes depend on the Board's respecting the results of GNSO negotiation.
Multistakeholderism differs from the conventional ICANN policy process in important ways. ICANN's conventional policy process is an awkward mash-up of a representation-based system, in which representatives of various industry groupings vote in a variety of subsidiary bodies,' 38 and an administrative-agency-modeled system, in which agency staffers consider input from interested parties in making their own policy decisions.1 39 The current multistakeholder process is less structured: it involves the provision of a forum in which an entity representing world governments
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can engage in free-form negotiations with the ICANN Board and staff, with the goal of winning all those policy concessions it turns out to have the political throw-weight to extract. It has always been the case at ICANN that pressure by those with influence and power gets results.1 40 To a significant extent, ICANN processes have tended to locate power in the set of folks privileged to sit at the policymaking table; its discussion mechanisms have also tended to privilege some participants over others. 141 In that respect, ICANN policy processes bring to mind what I have called a "bargaining" model of governance, in which policy-making is accomplished largely through negotiation based on relative bargaining power and appeals to shared values.1 42 That model has virtues but also key disadvantages-it falls short when it comes to transparency, rules that can constrain policy wielders to serve public rather than private values, and processes that ensure that all voices are heard.1 has self-consciously (though with mixed success) addressed itself to the question of how best to avoid "capture," structuring its policy process so that it is more than simply a raw battle over which side has more political pull at a given moment.1
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The GAC "multistakeholder" process, by contrast, follows a pure version of the bargaining model: GAC-Board interactions are little more than the exercise of political influence to the extent of the political actors' bargaining power. It is plain why the United States government likes the multistakeholder model; it thinks it can get what it needs under those informal processes because it has sufficient influence to do so. From the perspective of coherent regulatory forms, though, that does not seem like an improvement.
CONCLUSION
ICANN was born out of a self-contradictory attempt to "privatize" the domain name system (DNS); its relationship with national governments has been fraught ever since. The GAC's recent assertion of a more powerful role in ICANN has exposed a fundamental incoherence in the ICANN structure: governments neither are part of the ICANN policy process nor can they work effectively outside of it. This has resulted in a "dysfunctional" 48 Board-GAC relationship, and recently led to saber-rattling and uncomfortable decision-making. Moreover, there is no straightforward way to fix the problem.
This story speaks to both the limitations and the power of formal structures for involvement in ICANN's (and other entities') decision-making process. On the one hand, governmental influence in the ICANN process has long been defined less by the "law on the books" of formal relationships than by the "law on the ground" created by the potential for varying degrees of influence between governmental and nongovernmental actors. Governments have influence; they have always been able to express views to ICANN outside of any formal process; and ICANN's key task has always been-as one of its early CEOs put it-to "work from within the system to balance competing interests."' 49 Just as U.S. administrative agencies operate within a multi-institutional political environment, seeking to navigate among the various actors wielding power in that environment, so does ICANN negotiate with the wielders of power in its own environment.
At the same time-as in the administrative agency contextinstitutional design matters. Institutional design mediates power relationships in a political environment without dictating those relationships. The challenge facing ICANN relates not only to the degree of power governments can exert in its processes, but even more importantly to the institutional procedures and mechanisms within which that power is to be exercised.
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